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Recent experience with disasters and terrorist attacks in the US indicates that state and 
local governments rely on the federal sector for support after disasters occur.  But these 
same governments are responsible for investing in infrastructure designed to reduce 
vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards. This division of responsibilities – state 
governments providing protection from disasters and federal government providing 
insurance against their occurrence – leads to the tension that is at the heart of our 
analysis. We explore these tensions building on the model of Persson and Tabellini 
(1996). We show that when the federal government is committed to full insurance 
against disasters, states will have incentives to underinvest in costly protective measures. 
We then show that when the central government cannot verify state investment choices, 
the optimal insurance system would be designed to reward states that succeed in avoiding 
disasters and punish those that do not, thereby giving states an incentive to increase 
investment in protective infrastructure. However, this raises the question of whether the 
central government can credibly commit to such a scheme, and we find in a simple 
political model that it cannot. In our political model, the central government will decrease 
transfers ex-post if a state provides protective infrastructure that increases its expected 
uncertain income, generating a soft-budget constraint for states. This provides an 
additional incentive for states to underinvest in protective infrastructure. We discuss 
these results in light of disaster policy in the US. 
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Chaos in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the controversy that 
continues to swirl around the public sector response have led to a broad discussion of the 
appropriate roles of various levels of government in disaster management and 
preparedness. A central theme in press and pundit accounts of what went wrong in New 
Orleans was conflict between those who argued that the disaster was attributable to local 
officials’ failure to adequately prepare for an easily predictable set of events and those 
who blamed a slow and inadequate response by federal officials (Walter and Kettl 2006).
1  
While recent events have brought these questions to the forefront of public 
debate, many of the same issues have arisen in previous disasters, including the 
earthquakes, hurricanes and floods that irregularly strike particular geographic areas of 
the US. Clearly, a combination of preparedness and effective response are crucial to 
minimizing the overall welfare losses from these region-specific shocks. Yet policy 
design must confront a tradeoff between efficiently allocating resources ex ante to 
minimize potential losses, and dealing equitably with residents of regions that experience 
significant losses ex post.  This tradeoff and its implications for the design of public 
disaster insurance are the subject of the current study. 
The problem of the public sector’s role in preparing for and responding to 
disasters has been the subject of considerable recent scholarly interest. In part, this work 
has stemmed from a belief that natural hazards have increased in their frequency and 
intensity in recent years, a belief that appears to be largely consistent with at least a 
                                                 
1 Thomas (2005) provides an overview of events in the period immediately surrounding the breach of New 
Orleans’ levees; neither federal nor state and local officials come out looking very good. See 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9287434.  2
cursory review of the data on disaster declarations in the US.
2 In addition to their 
increased frequency, Richard Zeckhauser (2006) has argued that the distribution of 
disaster losses exhibits “fat tails” – losses experienced in the worst disasters are many 
times worse than those experienced in the second worst – implying that the most serious 
events may be expected to be extraordinarily costly.
3  
Our paper is related to several strands of literature.  The existence of natural 
hazards produces risks to income flows in particular places.  One strand examines the 
role that federalist institutions can play in insuring residents of a federation against 
income loss (von Hagen 1998 provides a useful review). When shocks to regional 
incomes are independent or negatively correlated, an insurance contract can be derived 
that transfers resources from regions that realize high income to those that sustain a 
negative shock. One example is when regional business cycles are not completely in 
phase. In such circumstances, a policy institution that provides a transfer to regions with 
strong growth fundamentals that are experiencing a downturn can enhance both aggregate 
stability and equity (see, for example, Bayoumi and Masson 1995). An empirical 
literature has sought to quantify the actual size of such transfers, an effort which is 
complicated by correlations in shocks across regions, by difficulty in distinguishing 
temporary from permanent shocks, and by the distinction between aggregate income and 
aggregate output. Melitz and Zumer (2002) summarize previous results and provide a 
well-founded estimate that central government redistribution offsets about 20% of shocks 
                                                 
2 See, for example, data on Presidentially declared disasters on the FEMA website 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema; last accessed August 28, 2006. Note, however, 
that these declarations reflect losses, which are jointly determined by hazards and vulnerability. 
3 When the subject is broadened to include potential losses from terrorism - disasters planned and executed 
by intelligent opponents as compared to a relatively passive natural environment - the complexity and need 
for serious attention become even more pronounced.  3
to personal income in four countries.
4 Within economically developed federations, central 
government insurance is thus an important resource for regions experiencing negative 
shocks.  
A second strand emphasizes asymmetric information and the moral hazard aspects 
of intranational insurance as in Persson and Tabellini (1996).
5  We adapt many features 
of Persson and Tabellini’s (1996) model to the study of natural disasters. Persson and 
Tabellini study the institutions of federalism in an economy characterized by uncertainty 
about future income in distinct regions of a federation, a situation that well describes the 
natural disaster setting. In Persson and Tabellini, as in our model, we abstract from 
household mobility and focus on immobile governments. Our focus does not imply that 
mobility is an unimportant feature of disasters. Indeed, location choice is a fundamental 
part of the process that determines vulnerability and is relevant to designing appropriate 
disaster response. Nonetheless, while residents may choose to relocate either before or 
after a disaster strikes, governments are defined by particular geographic areas and are 
thus fixed in place. We thus interpret our model as shedding light on the interplay 
between disaster risk and the institutions of federalism, not on the relationship between a 
central government and individuals. The latter interaction is considered by Kunreuther’s 
(2006) work on public disaster insurance for individual households and firms and 
Wildasin’s (2006) work on federal disaster insurance with mobile households. 
A third strand of literature relates to “second generation” models of federalism as 
reviewed by Oates (2005).  This emerging literature is often characterized by models in 
                                                 
4 France, the UK, the US and Canada 
5 Other papers that study various aspects of asymmetric information and insurance in a 
federation include Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001), Caplan, Cornes, and Silva 
(2000), Raff and Wilson (1997), and Lockwood (1999).  4
which information, politics, and strategic decisions play important roles.  Our paper fits 
into this emerging body of literature.  
Hazards policy in the United States is a complex interplay between the federal 
and state-local sectors. Broadly speaking, state and local officials bear primary 
responsibility for minimizing vulnerability to natural hazards through policies such as 
land use regulation, investment in protective infrastructure and providing resources 
designed to enhance emergency response.  
While the federal government is involved in these activities to a limited extent 
(Corps of Engineers flood control grants are a prominent example), the bulk of federal 
resources are devoted to providing assistance to individuals and governments after 
disasters occur. Between fiscal years 1974 and 2005, Presidents declared over 1,200 
disasters in the United States, and the federal government appropriated over $80 billion 
(constant FY 2005 dollars) for disaster relief. As indicated in the figure, as the annual 
number of declared disasters has risen, the average cost per year has risen above $3 
billion.  
While much of this relief was provided to individuals and businesses, a 
substantial portion takes the form of grants-in-aid to state and local governments. Since 
1998, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has obligated an average of 
over $2 billion per year to public sector disaster assistance. Roughly three quarters of 
these expenditures have been designated for ex post emergency response and repair of 
public facilities.
6 This division of responsibilities – state governments providing 
protection from disasters and federal government providing insurance against their 
                                                 
6 These figures exclude the response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. That event alone resulted in 
a $7 billion Congressional appropriation.  5
occurrence – leads to the tension that is at the heart of our analysis. When the federal 
government is committed to full insurance against disasters, states will have incentives to 
underinvest in costly protective measures.  
A second tension we highlight results from the timing of insurance commitments 
by the federal government. As indicated in the figure, more than half of the federal funds 
provided for disaster relief since 1990 have been the result of supplemental 
appropriations. That is, Congress has elected to appropriate large amounts of additional 
federal compensation to victims after disasters occur, raising questions about 
commitment that we explore in Section IV.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economy we study, 
and lays out the basic model of federalism with uncertain incomes. In this section we also 
derive the optimal insurance scheme and level of investment in protective infrastructure 
for the federation and demonstrate that when individual states act non-cooperatively, they 
will underinvest relative to this optimum. In section III, we describe the structure of the 
optimal insurance system when state governments choose investment levels 
independently and the central government cannot verify state investment choices. This 
system is designed to reward states that succeed in avoiding disasters and punish those 
that do not, thereby giving states an incentive to increase investment in protective 
infrastructure.  This goes some way towards internalizing the externality produced by 
central government insurance by in effect reducing the completeness of the insurance. 
Section IV contains an analysis of a distinct aspect of the problem. If the central 
government is unable to credibly commit to the constrained-optimal insurance plan of 
section III, as we show will likely be the case in a simple political model, then states will  6
recognize a soft budget constraint and will again underinvest in protective infrastructure. 
Section V concludes with a discussion of what the model can teach us about the federal 
response to recent disasters and those yet to come. 
 
II. Underinvestment with Moral Hazard 
 
We begin with a simple model of a federation with two state-level governments.  
To differentiate the two states, variables for one of the states are denoted with asterisks.  
Each state’s income has certain and uncertain components.  The uncertainty results from 
i.i.d. shocks.  Uncertain income can be high with probability P or low with probability (1 
– P).  A state can use some of its certain income (Y ) to invest in protective infrastructure, 
I, (e.g. levies or police) and this investment increases the probability of ending up with 
high income, so P is a function of I.  There are thus four joint possibilities for uncertain 
income: 
i. (YH, Y*H ) with probability P(I)P(I*) 
ii. (YH, Y*L ) with probability P(I)(1-P(I*)) 
iii. (YL, Y*H ) with probability (1-P(I))P(I*) 
iv. (YL, Y*L ) with probability (1-P(I))(1-P(I*)) 
 
First-best optimal transfers for given investment levels 
States are assumed to be risk averse and risk sharing in the federation is 
accomplished through a set of transfers.  The central government wants to choose  7
transfers Tij and T*ij for i=L,H and j=L*,H* to maximize the sum of expected utilities 
subject to the constraint that the transfers are self-funding, i.e. Tij* = -Tij: 
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where u* henceforth denotes utility given the value of the starred state’s arguments.  This 
first order condition says that transfers should be set to equalize the expected marginal 
utility of transfers across the two states.  Hence, optimal transfers for a given state 
investment level in the first-best results in full risk-sharing.  For cases (i) and (iv) above 
no transfers occur.  For cases (ii) and (iii), income is transferred from the state that 
realizes high income to the state that realizes low income.  With symmetric states (that is, 
identical utility functions, YL = YL* , and YH = YH*), optimal transfers will equalize the 
expected value of the uncertain component of income.  
 
First-best state investment levels  8
  Now consider the level of state investment that maximizes the sum of expected 
utilities.  In the first-best, we assume that the central government commits to full risk-
sharing grants that depend on the joint incomes of the two states, and that transfers will 
be unrelated to investment in protective infrastructure; this assumption will be relaxed 
later. Here there is no information problem since the central government is able to choose 
investment levels directly.  In this case, the first-best optimal investment solves: 
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where we use the fact that THH* = TLL* = 0.  With symmetric states (defined above) and 
transfers that exhibit full risk-sharing as derived above (so that YH + THL* = Y*L - THL* ) 
this reduces to:  9
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For future reference, notice that if there were no transfers the first order condition would 
reduce to: 







The presence of the transfers has inserted an externality into the problem because they 
make it so that one state’s investment affects the utility of the other state. 
 
Non-cooperative state investment levels given transfers 
We now want to explore the investment decision of an individual state that acts 
non-cooperatively.  How much protective infrastructure will a state provide?  An 
individual state’s maximization problem is: 
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The first order condition is: 
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The right hand side is the direct marginal cost of greater investment which results in 
lower certain income and consumption.  The left hand side is the marginal expected  10
increase in utility resulting from the fact that an increase in investment increases the 
probability of ending up with YH and decreases the probability of ending up with YL.  
Comparing to the above problem, the first order conditions are the same except that the 
two left hand side terms are multiplied by two in the previous problem.  This is because 
one state’s investment decision affects the probability of ending up in each of the four 
joint income possibilities.  The state takes into account the effect of its investment on its 
own utility, but does not take into account the effect on the utility of the other state.  In 
other words, state 2 benefits from an increase in state 1’s probability of ending up with 
YH (holding state 2’s probabilities constant).  State 1 ignores this benefit in its investment 
decision and invests too little in protective infrastructure from a social point of view. 
  Notice that if there were no transfer system, an individual state’s FOC reduces to: 







and the state would undertake the first-best level of investment.  The transfers have 
inserted an externality into the investment problem of the state. 
  To summarize, the central government can offer full risk-sharing, which would be 
first-best optimal if the central government could also choose state investment levels.  
However, if states choose their own investment levels while the central government 
offers full risk-sharing transfers, states acting non-cooperatively will underinvest in 
protective infrastructure.  If there were no transfer system, states would choose 
investment levels optimally. 
 
III. Transfers that Increase Investment by Trading-off Risk Sharing   11
 
We have thus far shown that if the central government commits and offers first-
best optimal transfers with full risk-sharing while states choose their investment levels 
and act non-cooperatively, states will tend to underinvest in protective infrastructure from 
a national perspective.  Thus, first-best investment and first-best risk-sharing transfers 
cannot be achieved under these circumstances. 
We next consider whether the central government can design a transfer system to 
increase state investment in protective infrastructure by trading-off the risk-sharing 
benefit of transfers.  One aspect of this is how the central government can get the states to 
voluntarily invest in a high level of protective infrastructure at the lowest cost in terms of 
transfers.  If the central government cannot verify state investment levels, transfers 
cannot be set to depend on investment levels directly.  Rather, the central government 
must depend instead on the observed income of the two states.  The problem is to find the 
minimum transfer necessary to induce a certain level of protective infrastructure subject 
to (i) the participation constraint that utility of the state given the transfer is greater than a 
reservation utility level, and (ii) the incentive compatibility constraint that the level of 
utility of the state given that it chooses a high level of protective investment is greater 
than or equal to its level of utility if it chooses a low level of investment.  The 
participation constraint is included here because we are interested in a constitution in 
which states voluntarily agree to the transfers rather than opting out of the federation 
altogether. 
To investigate the design of transfers that will elicit a high level of state 
investment in protective infrastructure while minimizing expenditures on transfers, we  12
modify the problem of the previous section in two ways.  First, we will write the problem 
in indirect form.  This will allow us to set up a minimization problem with a well-
behaved objective function and linear constraints.  To do this we define tLH* = u(T(YL, 
YH*)) as the utility of the transfer T that is based on the state’s observed income YL and 
the other state’s observed income YH*.  Letting v be the inverse of u, the transfer paid to a 
state given the observation of income YL as a function of tLH* is T(YL, YH*) = v(tLH*).   
The second modification we make is to generalize the problem to consider the 
case in which uncertain income is drawn from a finite set Y = {Y1, …, YM} for each 
state.  We also simplify somewhat by assuming that a state can choose from a finite set of 
investment levels I = {I1, …, IN}.  Given an investment level In, the probability that 
income level Ym is produced is Pnm where ∑m Pnm = 1 for each investment level.   
Given these two modifications, the expected transfer the central government must 
pay if the state undertakes an investment level In (the objective function that the central 
government is trying to minimize) is: 
) ( * * *
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For the first constraint, we must be sure that, given the level of investment, the state is at 
least as well off in expected value terms with the transfers than with no transfers.  The 
first constraint becomes: 
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For the second constraint, we must be sure that the state is better off with its chosen 
investment level In than with some other investment level: 
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∂ ∑ λ  
where  λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the first constraint and Φn’ denotes the 
multiplier on the second constraint for n’. 
This first order condition has an interesting interpretation.  First, suppose that 
there are no incentive problems so that none of the relative incentive constraints (the 
second set of constraints) bind.  This would be the case if, for instance, investment were 
observable.  Then the first order condition reduces to  






and the optimal transfer is constant in realized income.  Thus, when there are no incentive 
problems and states are risk-averse, the lowest cost transfer is constant in expected 
uncertain income.  As before, the optimal transfers would equalize the marginal utility of 
expected transfers and would not be adjusted as ex-post income is realized.  Think of this 
as an initial or base payment.  
Now consider what happens when there are incentive problems so that the relative 
incentive constraints bind.  Then the second term on the right hand side of the first-order 
condition becomes relevant and the optimal transfer will vary with the probability of a 
particular income level occurring with a particular investment level of the state 
government. 
To be concrete, suppose that the probability of a high income outcome when 
investment is high is greater than the probability of a high income outcome when 
investment is low (i.e. Pn’m Pn*m* < Pnm Pn*m* where n represents high investment and n’  14
represents low investment).  According to the first-order condition, the optimal transfer 
would be increased in the event of a high income outcome.  This gives the state an 
incentive to undertake high investment.  Conversely, suppose that the probability of a low 
income outcome when investment is high is less than the probability of a low income 
outcome when investment is low.  In this case, the optimal transfer would penalize the 
low income outcome by giving less than the base transfer. 
The problem for the central government, i.e. the reason that it cannot peg transfers 
to investment directly, is that a state’s investment in protective infrastructure is by 
assumption unobservable or unverifiable.  The central government can only try to infer 
the investment level of the state by observing the outcome.  If greater investment in 
protective infrastructure reduces the probability of a disaster and the amount of 
investment is unobservable, the central government should design grants that give states 
greater transfers when higher income is observed, and this should induce states to 
increase their investment in protective infrastructure.  This, in turn, increases the chances 
that the state would avoid the disaster or reduces its cost.  Thus, there is a trade-off 
between the risk-sharing insurance provided by transfers and underinvestment in 
protective infrastructure by states.  Incomplete risk-sharing that rewards good outcomes 






IV. Timing and Ex-post Central Government Grants 
 
  Up to this point, we have assumed that the central government credibly commits 
to the ex-ante optimal transfers derived in the previous section.  However, the transfers 
described in the previous section require the central government to effectively ex-ante 
commit to punish states that end up with a disaster in order to increase the incentive of 
states to invest in protective infrastructure and thereby lessen the costs of the disaster.  
But there is a real question concerning the credibility of the central government 
commitment from a political standpoint.  If the central government cannot credibly 
commit, a different and distinct reason for underinvestment in protective infrastructure 
will arise: the anticipation by a state that the central government will come to the rescue 
with transfers if a shock occurs.  If this is anticipated by the state government, the state 
would see a soft budget constraint and would under-invest in protective infrastructure.  
This soft budget constraint incentive for under-investment results from the timing of 
decisions and the possibility that the central government is unable to credibly commit to 
punish a state should a bad outcome occur. 
  To see this, we consider the central government’s choice of transfers from an ex-
post perspective and we incorporate a political motivation on the part of the central 
government to maximize its expected votes, following Goodspeed (2002).  In so doing, 
we move from a normative problem to a positive one.  Let p denote the probability that 
voters in a state vote to re-elect the government where p depends on the utility of voters 
in the state, pu > 0, and puu < 0.  Assuming that the unstarred state is hit by the disaster,  16
and assuming that state investment has already taken place, the central government 
chooses transfers to maximize  
)) * ( ( * )) ( ( Max * * T Y u p T Y u p     LH H LH L
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Notice that the central government equates the weighted marginal utility across states, 
with the weights being the change in the probability that the voters of a state vote for the 








































  Before we consider a state’s ex-ante investment decision, we investigate how the 
politically optimal transfer τLH* will change with ex-post realized income of the unstarred 
state.  The unstarred state would want to take this into account in its ex-ante investment 
decision since greater investment is going to increase the probability of a higher income 
outcome.  Differentiating the politically optimal transfer function yields: 























∂ * τ  
The change in utility from an increased Y will be positive so that ∂u/∂Y > 0.  puu is 
negative indicating that the change in the probability of the voters of a state voting for the 
incumbent diminishes as utility rises.  uTY is also negative since the marginal utility of the 
transfer will be lower the higher is income.  Hence, the higher income of the unstarred  17
state reduces the politically optimal transfer that it will receive.  Through a similar 
argument, it is easy to show that an increase in the income of the unstarred state increases 
the politically optimal transfer that it will pay. 
  Now consider the ex-ante investment decision of the state when it realizes that the 
central government will implement transfers τ.  The state’s investment decision will 
solve: 
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The first order condition is: 
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where we assume for simplicity that τHH* = τLL* = 0.  The first two terms are the same as 
before, so from our previous analysis we know that there will be an incentive to under-
invest because of the externality.  We now have two additional terms to analyze, 
however.  These terms arise from the fact that ex-post transfers will be affected by a 
state’s investment decision.  We know that ∂u/∂ τHL* < 0, ∂u/∂ τLH* > 0, ∂Y/∂I > 0, and 
we have just shown that ∂τHL*/∂Y > 0 and ∂τLH*/∂Y < 0.  Hence these last two terms are 
negative.  This is the effect of the soft budget constraint.  As it undertakes its ex-ante 
investment decision, the state realizes that ex-post the central government will have an  18
incentive to decrease transfers received and increase transfers paid if the state’s 
investment increases its expected income.  Knowing this, the state under-invests in 




This paper has studied a model of federalism which highlights the tradeoff 
between providing appropriate incentives for protection at the local level and insuring 
actual losses after a disaster occurs. Our results indicate that when state government 
efforts to prevent disasters are unobservable, federal disaster insurance will result in 
underinvestment in pre-disaster protective investment. As in Persson and Tabellini 
(1996), centralization of the provision of protective infrastructure would eliminate 
inefficiency by eliminating the moral hazard.  
Unfortunately, we believe that current US disaster policies may be susceptible to 
the dual problems of unverifiable local investment and a federal inability to commit to 
solutions that would lower the moral hazard problem. In particular, since information 
about local vulnerability – and which protective investments actually reduce this 
vulnerability - is likely to be most easily available to state officials, the principal 
responsibility for protective investment falls on state and local governments. Meanwhile, 
a large share of post-disaster relief funds come from the federal fisc. Our model suggests 
that in this institutional environment states have significant incentives to underinvest in 
protective infrastructure.  
Steinberg’s (2000, pp 103-111) account of the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) is an example of the incentives of unverifiable local investment at work. The  19
NFIP, adopted in 1968, offered insurance to residents of 100-year floodplains at heavily 
subsidized rates. In exchange, local officials were to increase protection by requiring that 
new structures be built above the 100-year flood level. Yet in the interest of economic 
development, officials in some locations granted numerous variances to these regulations, 
leading to ever-expanding claims on the flood insurance program.  
Federal transfers which reward successful avoidance of disasters would allow 
achievement of the constrained optimum when local investment is unverifiable. But the 
effectiveness of such a regime requires credible ex ante commitment by the federal 
government. This commitment may be difficult to sustain in a political model. Again, the 
evidence provides some support to this result. In recent years, initial Congressional 
appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund have been heavily supplemented after disasters 
have occurred.  When states anticipate an ex post bailout, they will again underinvest, as 
our analysis of the soft budget constraint problem indicates. 
While the model presented here provides preliminary insights into the nature of 
the problems raised by natural disasters, we see several directions in which this work 
could be extended. Here we describe two of these. Both of these extensions may add 
some richness to the findings reported here, but we believe that neither is likely to reverse 
our main conclusions. 
We model state government investment in protective infrastructure, but another 
major source of risk mitigation by state and local government consists of regulations: 
building codes, land use restrictions and the like. Such regulations are often seen from the 
state perspective as diminishing local economic growth, implying that our modeling 
assumption captures the basic issue. Nonetheless, explicit treatment of the choice  20
between structural and regulatory mitigation techniques might yield more nuanced 
insights.  
A second possible extension concerns the potential for spillovers from protective 
investments. In the case of flood control, for example, structures built to prevent flooding 
in one location can increase their probability in others. A well-known example is levees 
on the Mississippi River, which force flood waters to other, unprotected, locations. 
Generalizing the model to account for such externalities in the effects of protective 
investments will allow a more complete examination of the issues. 
The problems raised by geographically-concentrated shocks to income, regardless 
of their probability and magnitude, are difficult to solve. We study a simple model that 
we believe captures features of US disaster policy. In our model, underprovision of 
disaster protection will result from either full federal ex ante insurance or from ex post 
federal bailouts after disasters. The challenge is to provide appropriate incentives for 
local protective actions, whether regulatory or structural, while maintaining the benefits 
of insurance against large shocks. This is a difficulty that has bedeviled disaster policy 
makers for generations. Rewarding successful avoidance of disasters is one path to the 
constrained optimum. Achieving these benefits, however, requires more post-disaster 
discipline on the part of Congress than it has historically demonstrated.    21
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